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38 E3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994).
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
Daniel Podberesky, a 22-year-old Hispanic student
with a superior high school grade point average, applied
for a Benjamin Banneker Scholarship offered at the Uni-
versity of Maryland College Park (UMCP). The scholar-
ship was merit based, and awarded solely to African-Ameri-
cans attending the University. Because Podberesky was not
African-American, he could not compete for this scholar-
ship. Podberesky filed suit against the University, alleging
that the scholarship program violated the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. Podberesky sought injunctive and compensa-
tory relief, asserting the program violated Title VI and 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983.
The program at issue reserved approximately thirty
merit scholarships per year forAfiican-American students.
The University asserted that the program was remedial in
nature, compensating for the present effects of a long his-
tory of discrimination against African-Americans The dis-
trict court granted summary judgment for the University.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals re-
manded the case to the district court with instructions to
determine whether the present effects of past discrimina-
tion against African-Americans at the University justified
the program.3 On remand, the district court found the
program justifiable given: (1) the University's poor repu-
tation in the black community; (2) the underrepresentation
of African-American students at the University; (3) the
high attrition rate of these students; (4) and the percep-
tion of a hostile climate toward African-Americans at the
University.4
The district court based its first finding that the Uni-
versity had a poor reputation in theAfrican-American com-
munity upon reports about people who influenced deci-
' See Podberesky v. Kirwan, 764 F.Supp. 364, 366 (D. Md.
1991), vacated. The district court examined the program under
the equal protection clause because it is coextensive with Title
VI. The court rejected Podberesky's Sections 1981 and 1983
daims. Id.
2The university did not admit black students until 1954. In
addition, the University remained under federal civil rights scru-
tiny through the 1970's.
3Podberesky v. Kirwan, 956 F.2d 52, 57 (4th Cir. 1992).
4 Podberesky v. Kirwan, 838 ESupp. 1075 (D. Md. 1993),
Rev'd. 956 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1992).
5 al. at 1084-85. Studies included a report of an outside
expert evaluating the scholarship program and reports based on
focus groups of students and parents of high school students.
Over eighty percent of the participants in one focus group said
the university's reputation was negative. Id.
61d. at 1086-87. Podberesky cited only one positive response
which related to the athletic environment for black student ath-
letes. Id.
sions made by high school students on which college to
attend.5 The district court also relied on testimony by the
University's administration that supported this finding.
Podberesky argued that the questions employed by the
University were designed to evoke negative responses and
that the court overlooked the positive responses. 6 In addi-
tion, Podberesky offered studies to the contrary, but the
lower court found his studies flawed and rejected his con-
tentions.
7
The district court based its second finding of
underrepresentation of black students at the University
on historical data.8 The court found such evidence suffi-
dent to support this finding despite Podberesky's conten-
tions that the data was inaccurate.9
According to the court, one of the most significant
present effects of past discrimination at the University is
the significantly higher attrition rate for black students. 0
The court determined the cause of this disparity to be
remnants of past discrimination, including economic and
social factors, and the hostile climate on campus toward
Afiican-Americans."
The district court based its finding of a hostile climate
toward blacks on campus on the discrimination previously
fostered by the University.2 The court noted the history
of discrimination at the University, which included racial
segregation, resistance to desegregation, inadequate recruit-
ing and retaining of black students, and continuous over-
sight by the Office of Civil Rights.'3 The court cited as
additional support for this finding the internal disputes
which occurred throughout the University's attempts to
integrateM
4
The analysis then turned to determining whether the
program was "narrowly tailored."'I The court applied the
four part analysis outlined in United States v. Paradise.6
7Id. at 1086.
81d. at 1087-91. Data showed fewer than one percent Afri-
can-Americans attended the University in 1969. This propor-
tionate representation slowly increased to eleven percent by 1990.
Id.
91d. Podberesky argued the reference pool used by the Uni-
versity was inaccurate. Podberesky asserted the pool should in-
dude high school students who met University admissions re-
quirements Podberesky considered the criteria to be a mini-
mum 2.0 average and combined SAT score of 650 or higher.
The University argued the criteria were inaccurate because mini-
mum admissions requirements are flexible.
0 Id. at 1091.
l1 Id. at 1091-92.
12 Id. at 1092-94.
13 Id. at 1077-82.
141d. at 1093.
151d. at 1094-97.
'61d. at 1094 (citing United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149
(1987)).
First, the court found race neutral alternatives to the pro-
gram inadequate. 7 Second, the court emphasized that the
University reevaluated the necessity of the program on a
regular basis.'8 Third, the court determined that numeri-
cal goals of the program were valid because of the few
scholarships awarded.' 9 Fourth, the court found that the
scholarship program did not alter the rights of third par-
ties because they did not effect whether or not students
would be admitted to the University,7° Finally, the court
determined that because the program used only one per-
cent of the University's financial aid budget, the goal of
the program outweighed the harm to Podberesky or other
non-black students. Therefore, the district court upheld
the scholarship program.2'
HOLDING
The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded for entry
of judgment in favor of Podberesky.Y2 The United States
Supreme Court declined to review this case letting stand
the Fourth Circuit's ruling which invalidated the minority
targeted scholarship program at UMCP. 3 The Fourth Cir-
cuit held that the University violated the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by maintain-
ing a scholarship program solely forAfrican-American stu-
dents.24 The court also held that the scholarship program
was not "narrowly tailored" to remedy the alleged present
effects of past discrimination. In addition, the court in-
structed the district court to order the University to con-
sider Podberesky for the scholarship program and enjoined
the University from enforcing the racial qualification.
APPLICATION/ANALYSIS
I. STRICT SCRUTINY, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION,
AND HIGHER EDUCATION
In Podberesky, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
applied the heightened level of judicial scrutiny later used
in Adarand Constructors, Inc v. Pena.8 The court held that
the lower court erred in finding "sufficient evidence of
present effects of past discrimination to justify the pro-
gram" and in finding the program "narrowly tailored" to
171d.
'8 1d. at 1095-96.
'91d. at 1096.
201d. The University awards scholarships after students are
admitted. Id.
21 Id. at 1099.
238 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994).JudgesWilkins and Hamilton
joined Judge Widener's opinion.
73Podberesky v. Kirwan, 115 S.Ct. 2001 (1995).
24Podberesky, 38 E3d at 151.
2s 115 S.Ct. 2097 (1995).
6 Podberesky, 38 F3d at 151.
27 Id. at 152. The litigants contested the meaning of"strong
evidentiary basis" but the Circuit Court did not define it."Some-
thing less than the preponderance of the evidence" was agreed
remedy the alleged present effects of past discrimination.26
The court of appeals rejected the lower court's reasoning
that a strong evidentiary basis of the present effects of
past discrimination justified the program.27 Instead, the
circuit court employed a stricter test for showing such
present effects: "[T]he party seeking to implement the (race
based) program must, at a minimum, prove that the ef-
fect it proffers is caused by the past discrimination and
that the effect is of sufficient magnitude to justify the pro-
gram."28
Neither the poor reputation of the University in the
black community, nor the perceived hostility towards Af-
rican-Americans on campus standing alone were sufficient
to justify the program according to the Fourth Circuit.?9
The University's poor reputation was based upon a his-
tory of discrimination of which African-Americans were
aware. The court concluded that mere knowledge of a his-
torical fact is insufficient to justify such a program.30
As to "hostile climate," the court of appeals said it was
insufficient to justify the Banneker program because the
University did not make a sufficient showing that the cur-
rent climate was linked to past discrimination. Podberesky
argued to the district court that universities with no his-
tory of de jure discrimination faced similar racial prob-
lems, thus, he argued, the University's past history of dis-
crimination was not the cause of the present hostile cli-
mate. The district court had determined that defacto seg-
regation caused racial problems in the northern universi-
ties as de jure segregation caused problems at UMCP. The
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed, finding the
district court's holding in this regard premised on the as-
sumption that all predominantly white colleges discrimi-
nated in the past. Even if this assumption were true, the
court noted, it suggests a broad category of societal dis-
crimination which it is not the kind of discrimination a
race-based program can remedy.3'
The court of appeals also rejected the findings of the
district court that black students were underrepresented
and have a disproportionately high attrition rate.3Z The
Fourth Circuit Court ofAppeals criticized the lower court's
resolution of these factual issues on a summary judgment
motion. 33 Additionally, the court found fault in the refer-
ence pool used by the lower court.34
upon at the lower court level. Podberesky, 838 ESupp at 1083
n.49.




"8Id. The court noted, "If it were otherwise, as long as there
are history books, there will be programs such as this one" Id.
31Id. at 155.
32Id. at 155-57. The district court rejected Podberesky's
argument that the high attrition rate was due to factors such as




4Id. at 157.The district court did not determine qualifica-
tions for the reference pool, and rejected Podberesky's proposed
Having conducted its evaluation of the relationship
between present day and past discrimination, the Fourth
Circuit then shifted its analysis to whether the scholar-
ship program was "narrowly tailored" to remedy the al-
leged present effects of past discrimination at the univer-
sity. The court held it was not "narrowly tailored" for three
reasons.
First, the court stressed that high achieving black stu-
dents "are not the group against which the University dis-
criminated in the past."3 s The court concluded that be-
cause high achievers, whether black or white, were not
discriminated against in the past, the University could not
claim that the program was narrowly tailored to remedy
discrimination against them.
36
Second, all black students meeting the academic re-
quirements could compete for the scholarships, even if
they were not residents of Maryland. Therefore the pro-
gram was not narrowly tailored to increase the number of
highly qualified black residents of Maryland, the group
which the university identified in the studies it offered to
justify the program.
37
Third, in determining the underrepresentation ofblack
students at the University, the University counted black
students who opted not to attend the University for rea-
sons other than race. For example, students who chose
not to attend the University because they wanted to wait
a year before any further education were included in the
study. Therefore, the court of appeals found the reference
pool arbitrary and inadequate .3 Finally, the court of ap-
peals concluded that the University failed to show that
there were no race-neutral alternatives to the program.
39
In concluding that the University's scholarship pro-
gram was not narrowly tailored, the Fourth Circuit re-
versed the district court's grant of summary judgment for
the University as well as the denial of summary judgment
for Podberesky.
4°
II. THE FUTURE OFRACE-BASED SCHOLARSHIP
PROGRAMS
The Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue of race-
standards. The court of appeals Court found the pool inadequate
stating that the government cannot use the goal of remedying
past discrimination to lower the minimum criteria used to de-
termine the reference pool.





391d. at 158-61.40d. at 161.
41 Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265 (1978)(Supreme Court invalidated program which reserved
sixteen seats in University's medical school for minority students
stating race may be used as a positive factor, but may not be
dispositive).
42See City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,
493 (1989) (Affirrmative action must satisfy strict scrutiny like
based affirmative action programs at colleges or universi-
ties since 1978.41 According to a General Accounting Of-
fice survey, approximately five percent of undergraduate
scholarships, and ten percent of professional school schol-
arships, are reserved for students of a particular race or
ethnic origin. The Supreme Court's refusal to review
Podberesky casts doubt on the legality of these programs.
General affirmative action jurisprudence indicates that
governmental affirmative action programs must satisfy
"strict scrutiny."4 In addition, a trend of hostility toward
affirmative action programs is growing across the nation.
3
The Adarand decision reflects this trend, perhaps sig-
naling the demise of affirmative action. In Adarand, the
Supreme Court declared that federally funded race-based
programs must satisfy strict judicial scrutiny.44 The chal-
lenged program must serve an "important government in-
terest" and be "narrowly tailored" to further that interest.
This strict standard of review is likely to be strict in theory
but fatal in fact. Also, throughout the entire opinion, the
majority did not mention the term "affirmative action."
This suggests the Court's awareness of the hostility which
has developed toward affirmative action programs.
45
It is unclear how Adarand will affect state programs
designed to remedy present effects of past discrimination
at colleges and universities. Adarand left open the issue of
whether the same level of judicial scrutiny applies to gov-
ernment findings that present effects of past discrimina-
tion at colleges and universities are sufficient to warrant
race-based remedial programs. The Supreme Court de-
dined to review this issue, which was raised in Podberesky
v. Kinvan.
46
In addition, courts will closely scrutinize the use of
surveys and studies to show present effects of past dis-
crimination sufficient to justify remedial programs. If race-
based scholarship programs are challenged, it will be ex-
tremely difficult for colleges and universities to justify
them, unless courts break away from the exacting review
employed by the Fourth Circuit.
Summary and Analysis Prepared by:
Maria Feeley
that applied to government action to remedy the effects of ra-
cial discrimination that intentionally discriminates against mi-
norities.).
43 Legislation to eliminate racial preferences has been intro-
duced in Georgia, Michigan, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Caro-
lina, Texas, and Washington.
4Id. The original dispute involved a challenge to the fed-
eral government's practice of giving general contractors on gov-
ernment projects a financial incentive to hire firms owned by
minorities. The Supreme Court struck down the incentive and
held that federal race dassifications must satisfy strict scrutiny.
45 d. at 2099. Justice O'Conner, in her majority opinion
wrote 'Under the Constitution, any official action that treats a
person differently on account of his race or ethnic origin is in-
herently suspect and presumptively invalid."
46Podberesky, 115 S.Ct. 2001 (1995).
